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Abstract— The vehicles are equipped with electronic control 
units that control their functions. These units communicate with 
each other via in-vehicle communication protocols like CAN 
bus. Although CAN is the most common in-vehicle 
communication protocol, the lack of encryption and 
authentication causes series security shortcomings. There are 
many attacks reported and the number is estimated to increase 
with the rising connectivity of the cars. In this paper, we present 
CAN protocol and analyze its security vulnerabilities. Then we 
survey the implemented attacks and proposed solutions in the 
literature.   
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I. INTRODUCTION
The automobile industry has changed  
The modern vehicles are equipped with around 100 
Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to control the electrical 
systems to improve driving comfort and safety[1][2]. ECUs 
control most of the car’s functions including safety critical 
engine control, airbag deployment, and anti-lock braking 
system. To have a safe driving, ECUs should have a reliable 
communication network. The main in-vehicle communication 
protocol is Controller Area Network (CAN). Its well-
recognized advantages such as high immunity to electrical 
interference, easy wiring, and ability to self-diagnose and 
repairing errors make CAN bus suitable for the automobile 
industry. Although CAN is resilient to electrical noise and has 
some security features, it is vulnerable to attacks. As security 
of systems is becoming a significant concern, extensive 
research on vulnerabilities of the CAN and possible solutions 
are carried out. Some of these studies performed successful 
experimental attacks on commercial cars. Although most of 
the attacks are implemented via physical access to the bus, 
wireless attacks are increasing. With the new wireless 
interfaces like vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-
infrastructure, wireless attack surface will increase. We 
believe that wireless attacks will become the main attack 
surface for the future attacks.  
This paper aims to analyse the security of CAN protocol 
and show the vulnerabilities modern cars have. After 
identifying the attacks, it will present the solutions in the 
literature. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the 
following Section II the general overview of CAN protocol 
with security shortcomings are given. In Section III 
implemented attacks and proposed solutions in the literature 
are surveyed. In Section IV the work is summarised and the 
paper is concluded.  
II. BACKGROUND
A. Controller Area Network 
CAN protocol, developed by Robert Bosh GmbH in 1980, 
is a multi-master communication interface designed for the in-
vehicle communication. It is a broadcast network and can 
provide up to one megabit per second (bps). CAN bus has high 
immunity to electrical interference, is easy to wire, and has the 
ability to self-diagnose and repairing errors. The distributed 
architecture of the network makes maintenance easier and 
decreases the overall system cost.  
The robustness of CAN comes from the built-in security 
features. CAN protocol use differential wiring to eliminate the 
noise and has two voltage levels: dominant logic ‘0’ and 
recessive logic ‘1’. Hence there is no dedicated clock line, 
synchronisation is provided via signal edges and bit-stuffing. 
Bit-stuffing rule limits the number of repeated bits and after 
five consecutive bits of the same logic level, the next bit must 
be the complement of the previous logic level. If data have 
more than five successive corresponding bits, a complement 
bit is inserted by transmitter CAN controller and  it is ignored 
by the receiver CAN controller. 
Collision Detection and Arbitration on Message Priority 
(CD+AMP) resolves the collisions with the help of message 
identifier bits. When two nodes start transmitting at the same 
time, a higher priority node continues to transmit and other 
node/s will stop transmitting. Another collision prevention 
mechanism is Carrier Sense, Multiple Access with Collision 
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) which rules the nodes to wait for a 
certain amount of inactivity before transmitting the data to 
sense the node is idle and collision will not occur. 
Fig. 1. The bits of standard CAN bus frame 
There are also five error checking methods. These are; 
Start of Frame (SOF) single dominant bit for synchronization, 
Cylindrical Redundancy Check (CRC) checksum of the data 
for data integrity, Acknowledgement (ACK) bits for 
successful data transmission, and End of Frame (EOF) bit for 
stuffing error and frame finalization. 
CAN protocol also resilient to physical errors. It can 
eliminate the faulty nodes from the bus traffic with Error 
Confinement Mechanism (ECM).  ECM utilises two error 
counters in each node; Received and Transmitted Error 
Counters. The value of counter increases by eight at the 
occurrence of an error during the transmission and by one at 
the occurrence of an error during the receiving. Then node 
will enter the Error Passive state if counter’s value exceeds 
127; however, its error frames will not affect the bus traffic. 
If the counter value exceeds 255, the node will be in the Buss-
Off state and will no longer take part in the bus traffic. 
B. Security Shortcomings of CAN Protocol 
When CAN bus was initially designed in (1980), security 
was not the main consideration. It was used to connect a few 
ECUs and not accessible to the end user. However, the 
automobile industry has changed drastically and now there are 
dozens of ECUs connected and it is required by law that bus 
should be accessible for the diagnostic purpose[3].   
Although CAN has many security features, it is still 
vulnerable to the attacks. The main problem with CAN 
protocol is lack of encryption and authentication. The lack of 
authentication allows any unauthorised nodes to join the 
network and take part in the communication. CAN is a 
broadcast network so there is no source and destination 
addresses and every node can listen to any messages. Hence 
data is not encrypted, an adversary can listen and understand 
the data. This may cause privacy problems because modern 
cars also collect data related to drivers like location and 
address book. It also allows an adversary to inject faulty data 
on the system.  
CAN protocol also vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) 
attacks. Arbitration mechanism of CAN allows higher priority 
nodes to speak first. If there is a malicious node with the 
highest priority and active all the time, the other nodes cannot 
communicate because of the prioritization in CAN bus. 
Another Dos attack implementation can be a misuse of ECM. 
If an attacker generates an error during the communication, 
this will increase the error counters and eventually cause the 
elimination of the node. 
III. RELATED WORK
After overview and security shortcomings of CAN 
protocol, in this section we analysis CAN bus and present the 
attacks with the proposed solutions in the literature.  
A. Security Analysis of CAN Network 
In this chapter, we analysed CAN protocol based on CIA 
(Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) triad. CIA triad is 
simple security model to assess the system vulnerability. CIA 
triad analyses three essential principles which any secure 
system should have.  
Confidentiality is providing the data to only authorised 
people.  Cryptographic and encryption methods are used to 
provide confidentiality. Although CAN protocol does not 
have inherit security measures for confidentiality, some car 
manufacturers use cryptographic methods for local 
functionalities like keyless entry[4]. 
Integrity can be defined as the accuracy and validity of the 
data. The data must not be changed during the transmission. 
CAN has CRC checksum for verification of integrity so if any 
bit is corrupted during the transmission, it can be detected by 
the receiver. But CRC cannot detect the altered data by 
malicious node because there is no authentication. Therefore 
CAN protocol fails to sustain the integrity of data. 
Availability means data or network can be accessed by the 
authorised user at all times. This is not possible by the nature 
of CAN protocol because of the arbitration rule and physical 
implementation of the protocol. The arbitration rule allows the 
higher priority node to access the network. If a node with the 
highest priority transmits the data all the time, the bus cannot 
be accessible by the other nodes.  
B. Existent Attacks 
In this chapter, we summarise the attacks have been 
implemented in the literature. The first known attack on CAN 
bus is implemented on the electric window lift on the 
simulation environment by Hoppe and Dittman in 2007[5]. 
Since then, different attack scenarios have been implemented. 
We can categorise the attacks into three main categories: 
eavesdropping, data insertion, and denial of service (DoS). 
Eavesdropping is the starting point of the many attacks. 
Lack of encryption allows any node to understand the bus 
traffic so an adversary can sniff CAN frames and gather the 
information. This may cause the invasion of the privacy. The 
modern car collects information about the driver and has the 
capability to connect driver’s mobile phone. The adversary 
can steal this personal information by only passively listening 
to the bus. Enev et al. [6] show that it is possible to identify 
the driver based on the sensory data travel through the CAN 
bus. They were able to identify 15 drivers with 100% 
accuracy. The research says that it is also possible to identify 
the driver with even one sensory data (brake pedal). They 
successfully show that monitoring in-vehicle network can 
invade personal privacy. Eavesdropping can be classified as 
passive attack hence it is not disturbing the communication. 
However, it can lead to active attacks. For instance, Palanca et 
al. [7] captured CAN frames and identify the ID of the node 
they plan to attack. When they gathered the ID and data of the 
parking sensor, they implemented DoS attack. 
Data manipulation can be defined as the insertion of the 
unauthorised CAN frame to the network. Hence CAN 
protocol does not have an authorisation mechanism a 
malicious node can attach the network and insert data. Frame 
falsifying, frame injection, and replay attacks are an example 
of the data manipulation. Koscher et al. [8] were able to hack 
the instrument cluster, body control module, brake control 
module, and engine control module. They connected a laptop 
to On-Board Diagnostics II (OBD-II) port and implemented 
their attacks on a real car. They manipulated the fuel level and 
speedometer readings and showed false data on the instrument 
cluster.  The research was able to disable engine and change 
engine parameters like engine timing and engine RPM. They 
released the brakes and prevent their activation while car was 
running 40 MPH with continues fuzzing method. Hoppe et al. 
[4] implemented four different attack plots and analysed their 
effects based on comfort, security, and safety. One of the 
attacks was removing the airbag warning. The attack can hide 
the theft event while endangering the passengers’ lives. The 
research shows that driver cannot rely on the system security 
checks although manual checking is unfeasible.  
Denial of service (DoS) is preventing any particular node/s 
or the whole network to provide service. There are different 
types of the DoS attack implemented on CAN network. 
Mukherjee et al. [9] implemented DoS attack on SAE J1939. 
SAE J1939 standard is used in commercial vehicles and it is 
implemented on top of the CAN physical layer. They 
implemented three separate DoS attack. The attacks were 
sending too many request messages for a supported Parameter 
Group Number (PGN) to overload recipient ECU, sending 
manipulated False Request to Send (RTS) and causing 
overflow at the recipient buffer, and keeping the connections 
open via Clear to Send (CTS) messages and occupy the whole 
network. The work shows that the protocols implemented on 
top of the CAN physical layer can be also vulnerable to 
attacks. Palanca et al. [10] implemented selective DoS attack 
via attaching a stealthy node to the network.  They have 
implemented their attack based on the CAN protocol 
weakness, therefore, any car with CAN bus are vulnerable. 
The malicious node overwrites the bits and generates error 
frame. Because of the CAN error confinement, after a certain 
number of error occurrence, the transmitter node will go to 
buss-off state and no longer will be available. The attack is 
implemented on 2012 Alfa Romeo Giulietta. The attack 
method can disable any node connected to the bus. However, 
they disable the parking sensor for the ethical reasons. This 
attack is different than other DoS attacks because it does not 
send a whole CAN frame to the network. 
Some critics say that physical access requirement of the 
CAN attacks make them infeasible[11]. Although attacks 
mentioned above require the physical access to the CAN 
network, there are increasing number of remote attacks. The 
modern cars are equipped with different types of wireless 
interfaces. These are namely passive anti-theft system, tire 
pressure monitoring system (TPMS), remote keyless entry, 
Bluetooth, radio data system, and telematics. These wireless 
interfaces may have communication with CAN network via a 
gateway ECU which has a firewall. Some researchers pass 
over the firewalls and access to the CAN network. Checkowat 
et al. [12] compromised TPMS, Bluetooth, FM channel, and 
cellular network of the car. Then, they modified the ECU of 
the car. With this method they claim that a thief can steal a car 
hence car doors can be unlock via CAN network. Woo et al. 
[13] implemented a remote attack via malicious self-
diagnostic smartphone app. If a driver download a malicious 
app to monitor/diagnose the car, he/she allows the adversary 
to take control of the car without attaching any device 
physically. Then, attacker can implement their attack from 
long distance via using the phone’s internet. Valasek and 
Miller [14] carried out remote attack survey on 12 car brands 
and 21 commercial cars. They have identified remote attack 
surfaces and difficulty to compromise each car. The attack 
was three stage. The first stage was compromising the ECU 
responsible from wireless interface. The second stage was 
injecting messages to communicate with safety-critical ECU. 
The last stage was modifying the ECU to behave maliciously. 
The researchers believe that increasing number of cyber-
physical systems in cars will increase the vulnerability but 
they cannot practically verify this because of the high number 
of different applications in cars. Another wireless attack 
method is over-the-air (OTA) software update. OTA provides 
manufactures to reprogram the ECU to patch software bugs or 
add new features. It provides flexibility and saves money. But 
it is another attack surface that hackers can dive in the car’s 
communication network. There is no reported attack related to 
OTA updates yet but it should be considered as a critical 
threat. 
C. Proposed Solutions  
The attacks on CAN bus are analysed and some solutions 
are put forward. The solutions can be categorised as network 
segmentation, encryption methods, authentication methods, 
and intrusion detection systems. 
The simplest way to provide security is changing the 
network topology. Critical ECUs and non-critical ECUs are 
separated and the end user cannot access easily to the critical 
ECU network. The connection between networks is provided 
via a gateway ECU. This security measure is already 
implemented on commercial cars. However, the gateway ECU 
can be manipulated and the critical network can be accessed. 
If the gateway ECU is programmed to pass relevant IDs to the 
subnetwork, it can be fooled by sending malicious CAN frame 
with an ID of a node which belongs to subnetwork[4].  
Kammerer et al. [15] implemented star coupling router 
topology. The router not only separate single-bus based CAN 
system to multiple CAN segments but also bring new security 
features like unidirectional channels, traffic shaping, traffic 
partitioning, message integrity, and intrusion detection. In the 
paper [15], CAN segment security was taken out of the scope 
but replay or masquerade  attacks in a CAN segment may pass 
the router’s security checks and attack the other CAN 
segments. The safest solution will a node in a segment but it 
is not feasible for cost and timing perspective. It is also 
questionable that how much network segmentation increases 
the maintenance difficulty compare to the traditional CAN 
network. 
Due to the broadcast nature of the CAN protocol, any node 
can listen to the bus traffic. Hence CAN system does not have 
encryption mechanism, an adversary can listen CAN traffic 
easily and understand the communication. To prevent attacks 
and provide confidentiality different encryption mechanism 
are proposed in software and hardware levels. There are some 
software-based encryption methods [16] and some companies 
implementing propriety encryption techniques on their 
commercial cars. However software-based encryption 
methods are not strong enough because of the low 
computational power which results in weak encryption 
mechanism. There are reports that claim some of the 
encryption mechanism on commercial cars are broken[17].  
ECUs do not have much computational power, therefore, 
software-based encryption can cause latency which is not 
acceptable for the safety-critical automotive industry. The 
limited bandwidth is also another restriction. Software-based 
encryption may work with a limited traffic but it is not 
promising for the currently increasing CAN traffic. Shreejith 
and Fahmy [18] proposed FPGA based zero latency 
encryption. They enhanced the network protocol layer. The 
encryption and decryption processes are done while the data 
is buffered at the network layer. This will prevent any 
additional latency. However, if we consider the automotive 
industry and cost of ECU, FPGA based solutions are luxury. 
Any change in protocol layer will also require custom-made 
CAN controllers which is not feasible to change. 
In the current CAN protocol, it is not possible to trace a 
CAN frame and find its source. There is also no authentication 
which means that any node can attach to the network and send 
messages. If a malicious node injects a CAN frame, other 
nodes will accept it and process. To prevent data injection to 
CAN network, some authentication methods are proposed. 
Wang and Sawhney [19] proposed VeCure can authentication 
method with 50 us processing delay. The authentication 
mechanism work based on trust groups where high-trust 
group/s share a symmetric secret key. Although this method 
decreases the number of keys and the key number is 
independent of the ECU number, compromising of a node 
from the trust group will fail to protect the system. The 
authentication is achieved by sending data message followed 
by authentication message. The latency of the proposed 
method can be ignored but the bus traffic is doubled in the 
high-trust group which is not acceptable if we consider the 
limited bandwidth in CAN protocol. Woe et al. [13] proposed 
encryption and authentication method using AES-128 and A 
32-bit truncated message authentication code (MAC). The 
proposed method latency is about 378us at 60MHz. They 
claim that latency will decrease if proposed protocol 
implemented on Application Specific Integrated Circuits 
(ASICs). Although method looks promising, it is not 
compatible with the standard CAN protocol. Another 
drawback of this method can be using the symmetric key at 
the initial stage of the communication. If we consider a car’s 
average life 20 years, brute force attack can be implemented 
to compromise the method. Nowdehi et al. [20] identified five 
criteria for authentication systems to be implemented in 
commercial cars. These criteria are cost-effectiveness, 
backward compatibility, support for vehicle repair and 
maintenance, sufficient implementation details, and 
acceptable overhead. They have tested 10 methods they have 
found in the literature including the methods mentioned 
above. Not surprisingly, none of the methods can pass all the 
five criteria. The CAN protocol was not designed security in 
mind, therefore, it is hard to find a feasible security solution. 
Siddiqu et al. [21] proposed a physical unclonable function 
(PUF) based encryption and authentication and provide secure 
communication over CAN bus. They used elliptic curve 
Diffie-Hellman based asymmetric encryption method also 
called as public-private key cryptography. Asymmetric key 
encryption is safer than symmetric key encryption but it 
requires high computational power for current ECU 
controllers. According to their data, AES-128 encryption 
generates 366.66 ns and 110 ns latency at 60 MHz and 
200MHz clock frequency respectively. However, most of the 
ECUs have limited computational power like clock speed of 
tens of MHz[19]. In reality, latency will increase significantly. 
The other negative side of this proposal is it requires hardware 
change in the CAN controller and a server to authenticate the 
nodes.  This will increase the system cost and having a server 
can create other potential attacks. Murvay and Groza [22] 
proposed to analyse signal pattern to gather footprints of the 
transceivers to authenticate the node. The proposed method 
does not increase the traffic or changes the CAN controller but 
it requires intensive signal processing. If the network is 
compromised by software attack, the method will fail.  
CAN protocol has obvious security vulnerabilities. 
Implementing security features to CAN bus is a challenging 
job due to limited resources (bandwidth, memory, and 
computational power) and time constraint. This lead to 
extensive research on intrusion detection / prevention system 
(IDS / IPS). IDS analyses the CAN traffic and detect the 
abnormalities.  If any abnormality is detected, they warn the 
driver. The difference of the IPS from IDS is they can take an 
active role and prevent the attack. Fang et al. [23] 
implemented an adaptive network-based fuzzy inference 
system. They use information like busload, change in message 
number in a certain period, and a number of dropped messages 
and messages with illegal ID. They implemented the five-
level Sugeno algorithm and trained the network. They tested 
their method on a commercial electrical car. The proposed 
method detected the attacks but it is questionable that it will 
prevent complex attacks. Adding more methods 
There are also some commercial intrusion detection 
systems [24][25] but their algorithms are not shared with the 
public. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explained the CAN protocol and its 
vulnerabilities. We analysed the security of the protocol using 
CIA triad. Although CAN is the most widely used in-vehicle 
communication protocol, it fails all three benchmarks of CIA 
triad. The lack of encryption and authentication mechanism 
caused multiple attacks. We summarised the implemented 
attacks in the literature. Although most of the attacks 
implemented require the physical access to the CAN network, 
wireless attacks are increasing. We estimate that wireless 
attacks will increase and supress the physical access attacks. 
The reason behind this is cars are getting more connected and 
this will increase the attack surface.  
The main vulnerability of CAN bus is lack of encryption 
and authentication mechanisms. Extensive research carried 
out to find a solution to this problem. We categorised the 
proposed solutions. Some solutions provide large overhead to 
limited bandwidth, some change the standard CAN controller. 
There is no optimal solution hence CAN system was not 
designed security in mind. As a result, there is no approved 
solution by the industry and academia. The problem is 
mitigated with network segmentation and IDS. Although IDS 
does not provide complete solutions to CAN vulnerabilities, 
some of the methods are commercially available.  
Extend conclusion 
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